Showing posts with label review: The Triumph of God over Evil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label review: The Triumph of God over Evil. Show all posts

06 August 2008

the triumph of god over evil [4/4]













". . . It was the little girl's father, not God, who did these horrible things to her, so why is it belief in God that is targeted in the response?" (147).  This line, taken from Dunning's The Bookman's Promise, introduces Hasker's sixth chapter: "Why Is Life So Hard?"

Indeed, Hasker targets perhaps the most difficult question for people to answer in trying to figure out God and evil - why is it that bad things happen. . .especially when they happen to *good* people?  Again, the task of this book is to determine a way forward in understanding the relationship between God and evil from the perspective of free-will theism.  In doing this, Hasker once again review the problems of compatibilism, in that it leads to the notion that God is entirely happy with the world as it is. . ."there is no single fact he would wish to alter in any respect" (151, emphasis in original).  Thus, it is important to follow Hasker to reach the following: "I conclude then that a libertarian view of free will is essential for any adequate solution of the problem of moral evil" (152).  This, of course, entails a clear picture of moral responsibility (which is rather weak in determinism), but is also left open to positive value in the notion of free will.

Hasker evaluates 'The Structure of the Human World,' which sets forth four fundamental precepts before he structures his free-will theodicy (cf. 157-159).  His 'Free-Will Theodicy' is thus presented:
1) The world contains persons who are intelligent and free, living in communities within which they are responsible to and for one another (162).
2) The human world so constituted offers great potential for good in the realization and fulfillment of the potential of human persons and the development of human culture. . .(162).
3) So far as we can see, no alternative world that does not share these general features could offer a potentially good comparable to that afforded by the actual world. . .(163).
4) Frequent and routine intervention by God to prevent the misuse of freedom by his creatures or to repair the harm done by this misuse would undermine the structure of human life and community intended in the plan of creation. . .(163).
5) In virtue of propositions 1-4, it is good that God has created a universe containing human society as described. . .(163).

After dealing briefly with a few objections and limitations, it appears that Hasker's construction stands as a valid and good argument in the nature of the discussion.  Before moving to the next chapter, Hasker includes an appendix on Plantinga's Felix Culpa Theodicy (167-170).

Chapter Seven, entitled "Shouldn't God Be Doing More?," examines the angle of how the theodicy stands in light of the lack of divine activity among evil in the world.  Hasker begins with a simple - yet brilliant - point, "On the contrary: the idea of a loving God was first elicited by what God was believed to have actually done, first in the history of the Hebrew people but especially in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus" (172).  It would appear that sound Christian doctrine and theology has allowed this section of the discussion to be hijacked by those who run in the exact opposite direction.  

In this chapter, Hasker examines the problems given by Molinism and also Rowe's evidential argument from evil.  On the latter, Rowe contends: gratuitous evil exists; God and gratuitous evil are incompatible; so God does not exist.  But this logic clearly allows the inverse to be true: God exists, God and gratuitous evil are incompatible; so, evil does not exist (cf. 178).  From here Hasker engages the arguments more fully than my review will allow me.  He eventually reaches the problems with these answers on a pastoral level, "I believe, furthermore, that the detrimental effects of the belief that 'it is all for the best' do show up in practice" (193).

Chapter Eight finally reaches the climactic question of the book: "Can God Triumph over Evil?"  To be quite honest, a reading of Hasker's study and coming to a fuller understanding of the infinite complexities of the world and evil (especially as it challenges the legitimacy of God as the ruler of the world) gave me the sense that it was all insurmountable.  But such should not be seen as a tribute to the power of evil, but to the magnificence of Yhwh who defeats evil and establishes his kingdom.  As Hasker states, "In view of the underlying state of spiritual alienation, the prevention of individual acts of injustice would be comparable to attempting to clear a swamp of mosquitoes using a fly swatter.  Only a far more fundamental remedy has any prospect of success" (202).

Interacting with N. T. Wright's Evil and the Justice of God, and utilizing his own perspectives of open theism, Hasker asserts: "God, then, confronts a world in a state of extreme disorder" (207).  A brief recount of the biblical story demonstrates just how this has been done, most climactically in the resurrection.  But this decisive act serves as a prelude for the final defeat of evil which is assured.  "Is this then the triumph of God over evil?  It doesn't look that way. . .But apart from the details of the process, what would a triumph of God over evil look like?" (212-213).

To skip over a tremendous chapter: "It seems to me that the triumph of good over evil must mean at a minimum that evil is no longer able to oppose the good" (218, emphasis in original).  Following this, Hasker engages Wright (and a bit of C. S. Lewis) in concluding that it is the role of Christians to play a part in the inauguration of the new kingdom by making forgiveness possible and living out the defeat of evil in the world today.  "Evil may still exist in the sense of 'privation of the good,' in that there are persons made to love and enjoy God but who fail to do so.  But these persons will have no active power against the good, whether physical or moral or emotional" (225).

04 August 2008

the triumph of god over evil [3/4]











The middle three chapters of Hasker's superb treatment of God and evil center largely on the natural world.  He has, at this point in his argument, established that it is logically compatible to accept the premise of a divine creator alongside the existence of evil in the world.  However, he sets forth to move forward from this, "Mere logical compatibility, however, falls short of what theists wish to affirm and of what is demanded of them by their critics" (74-75).  As a caveat (and a critique) of how much of this topic has been handled, he offers: "Now, however, I want to suggest that a book about the problem of evil should not be focused too exclusively on evil" (75).

One of the issues which Hasker raises in Chapter Four is whether or not God created the best possible world, specifically dealing with the philosophy of Leibniz and William Rowe (the latter claims that if God does not create the best possible world then he cannot be considered morally good, cf. 76).  The argument given here challenges the notion of a 'best possible world' on a few levels, the most intriguing for me being the question: "If God is perfectly good, does this mean that he must, of necessity, create the best possible world?" (78).  This exposes a larger issue - that too much theologizing is stripping God of his freedom in creation.  Furthermore, problems abound when we try and determine or measure "best" in relation to creation (78-79).

What would work well with Hasker's approach here is the hermeneutic employed in Goldingay's Old Testament Theology, v. 1 - especially the emphases given to God's ability to create in his own freedom.  And it is precisely the point of free-will theism to say that God has given away his ability to control every aspect of his creation, thus "If God creates a world with this kind of freedom, then he voluntarily gives up part of his own power to determine how things go in this world" (80, emphasis in original).  An interesting challenge which Hasker discusses comes from the concept of grace, which has often (I have heard this in many forms) put forth the argument that God must have created an imperfect world (ordaining a fall) in order for him to demonstrate his grace.  But, as Hasker defends more fully, the concept of grace is necessarily a response and cannot be a reason for an action (e.g. 83f.).

In understanding creation, Hasker provides a basis for moving forward to a discussion of why evil occurs.  Theological determinism is weak on these points (I believe) and has difficulty in capturing the essence of Scripture.  "This [theological determinism] contradicts a great deal of what is said in the Bible, which repeatedly and emphatically insists that many things are not as God wishes them to be" (93, emphasis in original).

Chapter Five then deals with the question, 'Is the world cruel?'  Hasker begins with an evaluation of Dembski's rather odd reading of Genesis 1, appropriately challenging it and eventually exposing its serious contradiction.  One of the gems given in this chapter is the statement, "What often prevents us from taking this enlightened viewpoint is our natural egoism, in which we see everything from the standpoint of how it affects us personally" (111).  

The chapter sets forth Hasker's claims:
1) it is good that there should be a world (122).
2) it is good that there should be a complex, multileveled natural world (123).
3) it is good that a world contain living beings that are sentient and rational (124).
4) it is good that the creatures in the world should enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy (124).
5) it is good that there should be an evolving world, a world in which the universe as a whole as well as its component systems develop from within, utilizing their inherent powers and potentiality (125).

In a (very small) nutshell: What causes natural evil?  The laws of nature, mostly.  Is the world cruel?  "The world is not cruel, for it lacks the capacity to be cruel" (133).

From here, Hasker moves toward and presents a natural-order theodicy (cf. 138), which focuses more on the ability and freedom of God to create than it does in the personal experience of the individual who has experienced pain, suffering and evil.  So, could God have created a world in which we don't have this suffering (if so, why didn't he)?  This is ultimately is unanswerable and should not be speculated, less we stray from a correct biblical understanding of God.  This is important to Hasker throughout the work (and I commend him for it in light of the current divides between philosophy and systematic theology and biblical studies), who notes Job 39 and Psalm 104 and their unembarrassed record of all creatures made by God - even the dangerous ones (e.g. 139).

One further note: In Chapter Five Hasker relates these issues with the Jewish concept of Tzimzum.  While he does not necessarily subscribe to the theory, he does find some good food for thought in the concept.  Fundamentally, the idea is that God cannot manifest himself in his full glory lest the world be overwhelmed and destroyed because of its greatness.  Therefore he has 'withdrawn' his glory and granted 'autonomy' to his creation in order that life may exist and move forward as he desires.  Although there are certainly some holes which would need filled, this is an interesting perspective which comes into play at this point.

23 July 2008

the triumph of god over evil [2/4]










William Hasker, The Triumph of God Over Evil (Downers Grove: IVP, 2008).

One of the strengths of this book is its consciousness of both the philosophical and pastoral problem of evil.  Actually, the course of argument given here demonstrates that the problem really isn't separated at all - despite the fact that attempts to handle the questions usually fall into one of these categories.  So it must be remembered that philosophical answers must make an impact into the plethora of emotions given to those suffering from and battling evil.  To this end, Hasker's second chapter raises the question, "Does Auschwitz change everything?" - in other words, is there unredeemable evil in the world (cf. 35).

Much of the chapter is taken up in evaluation and response of John Roth's 'theodicy of protest,' who uses the Holocaust as a challenge to God's rule of the world.  One of the more powerful statements in the chapter is, "We have more power and more freedom than is good for us" (Roth in Hasker, 33).  The other major section of the chapter is given in critique of D. Z. Phillips, a philosopher in Wittgenstein's tradition who believes that the problem is more of a 'problem with God' than with *evil*.  Phillips believes that God could not be morally good and allow the Holocaust to occur at all (cf. 44).  In responding to these two perspectives, Hasker challenges the very philosophical assumptions made to present the arguments by Roth and Phillips - for instance, "Will it always and necessarily be the case that if we accept a theodicy according to which God allows certain evils in part as a means to our moral development, this will undermine or corrupt our moral motivation to respond to these evils?" (49, emphasis in original).

The third chapter is an overview of the free-will defense, specifically the arguments given by Alvin Plantinga (not without some critique and correction, of course).  The question which is on the table is whether or not the existence of evil is consistent with the existence of God.  Being a Christian theist, Hasker is obviously going to answer positively here.  But how does one arrive at the conclusion?  His most basic premise is that freedom must entail moral risk.  He states, "God simply cannot create free creatures and allow them to choose freely between moral right and wrong, and at the same time guarantee that they will never choose to do evil" (62).

His logic stands thus:
1) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good.
and
3) Evil exists.

And making the appropriate link is the challenge: 
2) God creates a world containing moral good, and all possible persons suffer from transworld depravity.

This is next taken into the world of natural evil, which he develops in a later chapter.  In keeping with his conversation with Plantinga, he considers how the concept of middle knowledge impacts the argument of the free will defense.  For those who are unfamiliar with Hasker's work, he has made some very strong and convincing arguments against middle knowledge in the past.  It is his contention that middle knowledge is a logical impossibility without stripping away genuine freedom.

In the final pages of chapter three, Hasker raises a few interesting questions on the nature of understanding God as good.  It shouldn't take a philosopher's mind to realize that much of Western belief in a 'good' God is contorted from what Scripture gives.  And at this point Hasker refrains from the Scriptural argument.  But, how is God good?  Only when we are getting things we want in the manner in which we want them?  This alone shows the inherent flaws of the ways in which we have attempted to deal with the problem of God and evil.

18 July 2008

the triumph of god over evil [1/4]

William Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering (Downers Grove: IVP, 2008).

The dialogue regarding God, suffering and evil has been long and often confusing (especially for many people who are struggling to find answers to their particular situations).  Indeed, most treatments on the topic tend to err by being overly theoretical and philosophical that they do not lend any support or comfort to the suffering, or they are so comfort-minded that they accomplish little more than simple reassurance and some quick counseling.  While I concede the need for either of these two options at particular points in time, neither really gets to the heart of the problem - to construct an understanding of God and the world which answers the problem of evil in the world while also maintaining the image of God which is envisaged by Scripture (and the church).

To this end, Hasker provides a solid step forward.

In the introduction is found this caveat: "To put it more briefly: a Christian response to the problem of evil should not be focused too exclusively on evil" (10).  At this point I realized that I would appreciate the author's perspective on the subject (and direction of the book), for he is quite right that too often we approach the topic (and many other theological/biblical discussions!) without adequately considering the biblical data.  Although this is a philosophical treatment to the discussion Hasker clearly writes from the position of Christian theism, a commitment which keeps him heading in the right direction on this point.

What Hasker is attempting to do in the present work is create a theodicy regarding the nature of the world of suffering.  Since a number of different understandings and definitions of this exist, he clarifies his approach as one which "seeks to provide a justifying reason for the existence of the evil in the world, a reason such that, if it obtains, God is not morally at fault for permitting the evil" (20, emphasis in original).

He begins by offering a review and evaluation of the current "state of play" in the work being done on the question of suffering - an overview of various arguments and defenses.  One of the first and fundamental questions which he raises in the book concerns the fundamental nature of these other options and defenses: "It seems clear, furthermore, that the most important question that needs to be asked about these arguments concerns their cogency as judged in the light of assumptions that are congruent with the religious worldview that is being called into question" (16, emphasis in original).

Finally, Hasker reviews his own theological disposition to approaching the problem of suffering.  As an open theist he works from the understanding that God does not control every aspect of creation - that there are elements which act outside of his will.  Although no open theist would deny that suffering can be explained (or that anyone would find comfort in these other models), I personally believe that issues surrounding suffering and evil provide opportunity for the openness model to demonstrate one of the strongest aspects of their position.  And Hasker indeed capitalizes on this in various points throughout the book.