quote of linguistics

"Drawing on my fine command of the English language, I said nothing."

-Robert Benchley

calvin, hobbes, and church growth

When engaged in discussions surrounding the notion of church growth, I tend to move forward cautiously.  This is because I believe that we can too easily err on the side of taking every newly packaged, refurbished idea which overemphasizes its particular strength of "every healthy church."  In this context, I humbly offer the following thoughts.

First. . .What is the point of church growth?  How we answer this is revealing to our motives and theology.  Further, can we be accused of identifying particular church growth ideals without actually making them an actualization in our practice?  So if we can move beyond the pat Sunday School-type answers, we might find that much of our church growth (and administration/leadership) come under two broad categories: inward stability and outward mobility.  These, I submit to you, are the Calvin and Hobbes of modern evangelicalism.

[N.B. - The designations Calvin and Hobbes are meant to refer here to the two great philosophical minds which frequented daily newspapers during the latter half of the twentieth century, not the other fellows you've learned of in Philosophy 101]

Hobbes: Inward Stability: The notion that we find security in our surroundings, like big cats who sit comfortably next to a fire and only occasionally engage in the surrounding world, mostly when it is convenient and self-beneficial.  Even like those of the domesticated variety, these are typically animals who do not wish to be bothered, touched or disturbed when they are going on about their business but have no qualms over interrupting, bothering, touching and disturbing others whenever they feel like doing so.

Calvin: Outward Mobility: The desire to be significant no matter how foolish it may look, often wanting to work with the big cats but who often find the process too intimidating.  The personality found here is the self-perception that they are of great significance and need to benefit others by sharing their importance with the world (even though others rarely regard them as being of great significance at all).

Broad strokes over rough edges, I admit.  But the fundamental idea is intact (I think). . .to which end church growth?  Do we desire bigger congregations just so that we might find the 'large church' stability?  Or do we want to see the kingdom of God move in spite of our virtues and over our vices?  One might be able to argue that these two animals would be incomplete without each other.  Maybe.  But this might assume that strength and security are found/achieved in places other than the Spirit.  And security is not all bad, either. . .rather, "I would rather live on the verge of falling and trust in the all-sufficiency of Jesus. . ." (:rich).

Once again, it's all about motive.

the triumph of god over evil [4/4]

William Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil (Downers Grove: IVP, 2008).

". . . It was the little girl's father, not God, who did these horrible things to her, so why is it belief in God that is targeted in the response?" (147).  This line, taken from Dunning's The Bookman's Promise, introduces Hasker's sixth chapter: "Why Is Life So Hard?"

Indeed, Hasker targets perhaps the most difficult question for people to answer in trying to figure out God and evil - why is it that bad things happen. . .especially when they happen to *good* people?  Again, the task of this book is to determine a way forward in understanding the relationship between God and evil from the perspective of free-will theism.  In doing this, Hasker once again review the problems of compatibilism, in that it leads to the notion that God is entirely happy with the world as it is. . ."there is no single fact he would wish to alter in any respect" (151, emphasis in original).  Thus, it is important to follow Hasker to reach the following: "I conclude then that a libertarian view of free will is essential for any adequate solution of the problem of moral evil" (152).  This, of course, entails a clear picture of moral responsibility (which is rather weak in determinism), but is also left open to positive value in the notion of free will.

Hasker evaluates 'The Structure of the Human World,' which sets forth four fundamental precepts before he structures his free-will theodicy (cf. 157-159).  His 'Free-Will Theodicy' is thus presented:

1) The world contains persons who are intelligent and free, living in communities within which they are responsible to and for one another (162).

2) The human world so constituted offers great potential for good in the realization and fulfillment of the potential of human persons and the development of human culture. . .(162).

3) So far as we can see, no alternative world that does not share these general features could offer a potentially good comparable to that afforded by the actual world. . .(163).

4) Frequent and routine intervention by God to prevent the misuse of freedom by his creatures or to repair the harm done by this misuse would undermine the structure of human life and community intended in the plan of creation. . .(163).

5) In virtue of propositions 1-4, it is good that God has created a universe containing human society as described. . .(163).

After dealing briefly with a few objections and limitations, it appears that Hasker's construction stands as a valid and good argument in the nature of the discussion.  Before moving to the next chapter, Hasker includes an appendix on Plantinga's Felix Culpa Theodicy (167-170).

Chapter Seven, entitled "Shouldn't God Be Doing More?," examines the angle of how the theodicy stands in light of the lack of divine activity among evil in the world.  Hasker begins with a simple - yet brilliant - point, "On the contrary: the idea of a loving God was first elicited by what God was believed to have actually done, first in the history of the Hebrew people but especially in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus" (172).  It would appear that sound Christian doctrine and theology has allowed this section of the discussion to be hijacked by those who run in the exact opposite direction.  

In this chapter, Hasker examines the problems given by Molinism and also Rowe's evidential argument from evil.  On the latter, Rowe contends: gratuitous evil exists; God and gratuitous evil are incompatible; so God does not exist.  But this logic clearly allows the inverse to be true: God exists, God and gratuitous evil are incompatible; so, evil does not exist (cf. 178).  From here Hasker engages the arguments more fully than my review will allow me.  He eventually reaches the problems with these answers on a pastoral level, "I believe, furthermore, that the detrimental effects of the belief that 'it is all for the best' do show up in practice" (193).

Chapter Eight finally reaches the climactic question of the book: "Can God Triumph over Evil?"  To be quite honest, a reading of Hasker's study and coming to a fuller understanding of the infinite complexities of the world and evil (especially as it challenges the legitimacy of God as the ruler of the world) gave me the sense that it was all insurmountable.  But such should not be seen as a tribute to the power of evil, but to the magnificence of Yhwh who defeats evil and establishes his kingdom.  As Hasker states, "In view of the underlying state of spiritual alienation, the prevention of individual acts of injustice would be comparable to attempting to clear a swamp of mosquitoes using a fly swatter.  Only a far more fundamental remedy has any prospect of success" (202).

Interacting with N. T. Wright's Evil and the Justice of God, and utilizing his own perspectives of open theism, Hasker asserts: "God, then, confronts a world in a state of extreme disorder" (207).  A brief recount of the biblical story demonstrates just how this has been done, most climactically in the resurrection.  But this decisive act serves as a prelude for the final defeat of evil which is assured.  "Is this then the triumph of God over evil?  It doesn't look that way. . .But apart from the details of the process, what would a triumph of God over evil look like?" (212-213).

To skip over a tremendous chapter: "It seems to me that the triumph of good over evil must mean at a minimum that evil is no longer able to oppose the good" (218, emphasis in original).  Following this, Hasker engages Wright (and a bit of C. S. Lewis) in concluding that it is the role of Christians to play a part in the inauguration of the new kingdom by making forgiveness possible and living out the defeat of evil in the world today.  "Evil may still exist in the sense of 'privation of the good,' in that there are persons made to love and enjoy God but who fail to do so.  But these persons will have no active power against the good, whether physical or moral or emotional" (225).

open theism: answering the critics

My friend, John Sanders, pointed me to this collection of videos which were taken at Azusa Pacific University in April 2008.  The conference was on "Open Theology and Science" and this series of responses to the critics of openness was toward the conclusion.  I've included John's initial remarks, but the whole series can be found here.

the triumph of god over evil [3/4]

William Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil (Downers Grove: IVP, 2008).

The middle three chapters of Hasker's superb treatment of God and evil center largely on the natural world.  He has, at this point in his argument, established that it is logically compatible to accept the premise of a divine creator alongside the existence of evil in the world.  However, he sets forth to move forward from this, "Mere logical compatibility, however, falls short of what theists wish to affirm and of what is demanded of them by their critics" (74-75).  As a caveat (and a critique) of how much of this topic has been handled, he offers: "Now, however, I want to suggest that a book about the problem of evil should not be focused too exclusively on evil" (75).

One of the issues which Hasker raises in Chapter Four is whether or not God created the best possible world, specifically dealing with the philosophy of Leibniz and William Rowe (the latter claims that if God does not create the best possible world then he cannot be considered morally good, cf. 76).  The argument given here challenges the notion of a 'best possible world' on a few levels, the most intriguing for me being the question: "If God is perfectly good, does this mean that he must, of necessity, create the best possible world?" (78).  This exposes a larger issue - that too much theologizing is stripping God of his freedom in creation.  Furthermore, problems abound when we try and determine or measure "best" in relation to creation (78-79).

What would work well with Hasker's approach here is the hermeneutic employed in Goldingay's Old Testament Theology, v. 1 - especially the emphases given to God's ability to create in his own freedom.  And it is precisely the point of free-will theism to say that God has given away his ability to control every aspect of his creation, thus "If God creates a world with this kind of freedom, then he voluntarily gives up part of his own power to determine how things go in this world" (80, emphasis in original).  An interesting challenge which Hasker discusses comes from the concept of grace, which has often (I have heard this in many forms) put forth the argument that God must have created an imperfect world (ordaining a fall) in order for him to demonstrate his grace.  But, as Hasker defends more fully, the concept of grace is necessarily a response and cannot be a reason for an action (e.g. 83f.).

In understanding creation, Hasker provides a basis for moving forward to a discussion of why evil occurs.  Theological determinism is weak on these points (I believe) and has difficulty in capturing the essence of Scripture.  "This [theological determinism] contradicts a great deal of what is said in the Bible, which repeatedly and emphatically insists that many things are not as God wishes them to be" (93, emphasis in original).

Chapter Five then deals with the question, 'Is the world cruel?'  Hasker begins with an evaluation of Dembski's rather odd reading of Genesis 1, appropriately challenging it and eventually exposing its serious contradiction.  One of the gems given in this chapter is the statement, "What often prevents us from taking this enlightened viewpoint is our natural egoism, in which we see everything from the standpoint of how it affects us personally" (111).  

The chapter sets forth Hasker's claims:

1) it is good that there should be a world (122).

2) it is good that there should be a complex, multileveled natural world (123).

3) it is good that a world contain living beings that are sentient and rational (124).

4) it is good that the creatures in the world should enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy (124).

5) it is good that there should be an evolving world, a world in which the universe as a whole as well as its component systems develop from within, utilizing their inherent powers and potentiality (125).

In a (very small) nutshell: What causes natural evil?  The laws of nature, mostly.  Is the world cruel?  "The world is not cruel, for it lacks the capacity to be cruel" (133).

From here, Hasker moves toward and presents a natural-order theodicy (cf. 138), which focuses more on the ability and freedom of God to create than it does in the personal experience of the individual who has experienced pain, suffering and evil.  So, could God have created a world in which we don't have this suffering (if so, why didn't he)?  This is ultimately is unanswerable and should not be speculated, less we stray from a correct biblical understanding of God.  This is important to Hasker throughout the work (and I commend him for it in light of the current divides between philosophy and systematic theology and biblical studies), who notes Job 39 and Psalm 104 and their unembarrassed record of all creatures made by God - even the dangerous ones (e.g. 139).

One further note: In Chapter Five Hasker relates these issues with the Jewish concept of Tzimzum.  While he does not necessarily subscribe to the theory, he does find some good food for thought in the concept.  Fundamentally, the idea is that God cannot manifest himself in his full glory lest the world be overwhelmed and destroyed because of its greatness.  Therefore he has 'withdrawn' his glory and granted 'autonomy' to his creation in order that life may exist and move forward as he desires.  Although there are certainly some holes which would need filled, this is an interesting perspective which comes into play at this point.